Interstate Agreements for Air Pollution Control by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1968 
Issue 2 Air Pollution 
January 1968 
Interstate Agreements for Air Pollution Control 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Interstate Agreements for Air Pollution Control, 1968 WASH. U. L. Q. 260 (1968). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1968/iss2/5 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
INTERSTATE AGREEMENTS FOR AIR
POLLUTION CONTROL
I. RECOGNITION OF INTERSTATE ASPECTS OF AIR POLLUTION
The existence of polluted air has been recognized for a long time.1
Yet prevention and control measures are all of relatively recent vin-
tage in this country.2 Reasons cited for lack of progress in the past
have included political considerations, lack of funds for control agen-
cies, organizational problems, the magnitude of the problem, economic
ramifications of aggressive emission control, and public indifference
to the effects of pollution and unwillingness to demand adequate con-
trol measures.3 However, the evident nature of pollution, publicity,
and prodding by the federal government have produced, in the last
few years, a large quantitative increase in the enactment of environ-
mental control legislation by all levels of government. Indeed, in 1967,
the legislative output dealing with air pollution, noise control and solid
waste disposal was triple that of 1966. 4
Meteorological data confirms what is obvious to any resident of an in-
terstate (or international)5 urban or industrial area-contaminated air
1. ... this most excellent canopy, the air, look you, this brave o'erhanging firmament,
this majestical roof fretted with golden fire, why, it appears no other thing to me
than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours.
W. SHAKcasPsEAan, HAmI.Er, Act II, scene ii, England has had air pollution laws for 600
years. Leighton, Geographical Aspects of Air Pollution, 56 GEOGRAPHICAL Rv. 151, 152
(1966).
2. See Leighton, supra note I. For a good non-technical discussion of air pollution, see
Griffin, The Air Around Us, 31 REP. 39 (Sept. 10, 1964).
3. Barkley, Air Pollution Prevention in the United States, 73 MECHANICAL ENG. 284,
288 (1951).
4. 1 CLEAN AIR Naws 1 (Oct. 17, 1967).
5. In 1928, the United States and Canada attempted to deal with some of the problems
of international air pollution by forming an International Joint Commission. To date
the Commission has examined sulfur smelter contamination problems stemming from
a smelter in Trail, B.C., U.S. BUREAU OF MINES BULL.ETIN No. 453 (1944). It has also
held public hearings in 1967 in the Detroit-Windsor, Port-Huron-Sarnia metropolitan
areas to determine (1) whether air is being polluted on either side of the international
boundary; (2) sources of pollution and their extent; (3) necessary preventive or remedial
measures; and (4) cost estimates for these measures, 55 DEPr STATE BULL. 688 (1966); 1
CLEAN Ama NEws 15 (June 13, 1967). Agreements for the abatement of international air
pollution would apparently be akin to interstate compacts. Megonnell & Griswold,
Federal Air Pollution Prevention and Abatement Responsibilities and Operations, 16
J. Am PoLrTIoN CONTROL AssN 526, 527 (1966) [hereinafter cited as JAPCA].
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respects no political boundaries.0 Thus with twenty-six standard met-
ropolitan statistical areas7 including territory in two or more states,8
and seventy-two regional interstate areas affected by pollution,9 the
need for interjurisdictional control of air pollution is clear.
Various governmental techniques for dealing with an interstate
problem are available. The interstate compact is an obvious alterna-
tive.1 ' Others include informal administrative agreements between
states, planning by private or quasi-public organizations, and direct
federal intervention." A hybrid approach would provide for federal
intervention during the hiatus between recognition of the problem
and implementation of a compact.'* Each technique has been employed,
with varying degrees of success.' 3 While, in the abstract, federal en-
forcement of air quality standards would appear to be the most viable
means of control, the federal Clean Air Act of 196314 and Air Quality
Act of 196715 have sought, by what is termed "creative federalism"'1 to
encourage the states, through technical and financial aid, to develop
appropriate abatement programs and to effectuate and enforce them
across jurisdictional boundaries by use of a compactually created inter-
state agency.1 7
Unfortunately, the states have not provided much justification for
Congress' belief in their ability and motivation to cope with inter-
to. L. BATTEN, THE UNCLEAN SKy (1966); Am POLLUTION HANDBOOK § 14.3 (P. MagiU, F.
Holden & C. Ackley, ed. 1956); Hartmann, Legal Regulation of Air Pollution, 41 IND. &
ENG. CHEM. 2391, 2394 (1949).
7. A standard metropolitan statistical area is a county or group of contigious counties
which contains at least one central city of at least 50,000 persons or "twin" cities with a
combined population of at least 50,000. Other contigious counties are included in the
aica if they are essentially metropolitan in character and are socially and economically
integrated with the central city. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABsTRAcr OF THE
UNITED STATES 17 (86th ed. 1965).
8. Edelman, Legal Problems of Interjurisdictional Air Pollution Control, 13 JAPGA
310, 311.12 (1963).
9. 5 AIR/WATER POLLUTION REP. 128 (1967).
10. See Hofflund, National Aspects of Air Pollution Legislation, Am POLLUTION 769
(L. McCabe, ed. 1952) for early recognition of the use of the compact for air pollution
control.
11. Tobin, The Interstate Metropolitan District and Cooperative Federalism, 36 TUL.
L.R. 67, 68-9 (1961).
12. 70 PUB. HEALTH REP. 638, 640 (1955).
13. See notes 88-159 infra and accompanying text.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. III, 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).
16. Weaver, Creative Federalism and Metropolitan Development, I METRo. VIEWPOINTS
1 (1966).
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a, c(a), d(b) (1964), as amended, (Supp. III, 1968).
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jurisdictional air pollution problems. Air pollution plagues many
multi-state areas, but only in a few instances have there been meaning-
ful interstate attempts at control. Even when such attempts have been
made, the results are unsatisfactory. This has been the compact ex-
perience to date.
Although implementation of compactual solutions to air pollution
problems has been emasculated by the Congressional consent require-
ment, the federal government still may be potentially the most effec-
tive combatant of interstate air pollution. The federal government may
eventually assume all responsibility in interstate air pollution control.
In any event, prospective compact participants should weigh the con-
trol potential of a state-federal relationship, as possible under extant
legislation (see note in this symposium on federal law) with that af-
forded by the interstate compact.
II. INTERSTATE COMPACTS AS A CONTROL TECHNIQUE
The United States Constitution permits a state, with the "consent
of Congress," to ". . . enter into any agreement or compact with an-
other state. . . " impliedly for the solution of common problems.' 8
Until the twentieth century, the states employed this option sparingly.
Innocuous boundary settlement agreements were the predominant
compact type.19 Boundary compacts, such as the Missouri and Arkansas
Boundary Compact of 1846,20 were resorted to when other means for
the resolution of the dispute were ineffective. None created a per-
manent administrative agency.
Milestones in the development of the compact as more than a device
for the settlement of a single dispute were the New York Port Author-
ity2 ' and Colorado River 22 Compacts. These compacts provided, for
the first time, a regional approach to a common problem coupled with
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
19. R. LEACH & R. SUGG, JR., TIE ADMINISTRATION OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 5 (1959)
[hereinafter cited as LEACH & SUG]; Frankfurter & Landis, The Compact Clause of the
Constitution, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 696 (1925).
20. Dig. Ark. Laws, 1857, d. 13, p. 154 (1857); Mo. Laws, 1847, 13.
21. The compact creates Port of New York Authority for development of transporta.
don and terminal facilities and promotion of commerce in the Port Area. Participants:
New York, New Jersey. For text of compact see, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:1-1 to -174 (1963).
22. Compact apportions water of the Colorado River; provides for division of water
between upper and lower basin by providing water storage and flood protection facilities.
Participants: Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming. For
text of compact, see, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-13-10 (1963).
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the creation of an administrative agency necessary for continuous im-
pact.23 Contemporaneously, Felix Frankfurter and James Landis pub-
lished their landmark article, The Compact Clause of the Constitu-
tion-A Study in Interstate A djustments,24 which focused attention on
the efficacy of compacts as a regulatory device.
Since the 1920's compacts have proliferated in number and treated
a spectrum of subject matter.2 5 Notable in the recent historical devel-
opment of compacts have been the Interstate Sanitation (Tri-State)26
and Delaware River Basin Compacts. 27 The latter first included full
federal participation in a compact and fused federal aid to interstate
co-operation through compacts, two formerly divergent trends of de-
velopment.s Air pollution control as a subject matter was first rec-
ognized compactually in the Interstate Sanitation Compact as amended
in 1954.29
Interstate compacts can be classified under three headings:30
1. Technical: Primary water allocation compacts. 3 1
2. Advisory: Bodies created in an investigatory capacity. Usually
concerned with a single issue.32
3. Operating: Empower bodies created to own and operate various
facilities or institutions.33
For effective control of air pollution, compacts must be the operating
type. Unless the control agency has the ability to evaluate a pollution
problem, prescribe its remedy, and administer the process involved in
the attainment of a control objective, pollution control will be in-
23. F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COmPACT SINCE 1925 at 5 (1951).
24. See note 19 supra.
25. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTER-STATE COMPACTS: 1783-1966 (1966), for a
current listing.
26. Participants: Connecticut, New Jersey, New York. For text of compact, see, e.g.,
N.J. ST r.. ANN. § 32:18-1 to 32:19A (1963); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LiAW § 1299-1 (McKinney
Supp. 1966). Only New Jersey and New York participate in air pollution study and control.
See N.J. STAT. A%N. § 32:19A-1 (1963).
27. Compact creates agency with extensive regulatory and administrative powers for
the "multi- purpose" development of water resources in the Delaware basin region. Partici-
pants; Delaware, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, United States. For text of compact
see. e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 815.31 to 815.106 (1967).
28. See Grad, Federal.State Compact: A New Experiment in Co-operative Federalism,
63 COLUM. L. Rrv. 825 (1963), for a delineation of the formation of the basin compact.
29. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1299-1 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
30. LEACH & SUGG 18, 19-20.
31. E.g., Yellowstone River Compact. Participants: Montana, North Dakota, Wyoming.
For text of compact see, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 41-511 (1959).
32. E.g., Tri-State Compact, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:18-1 (1963).
33. E.g., Port of New York Authority, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1-1 to -174 (1963).
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complete. Reliance on other agencies of government to perform these
tasks will produce undesirable results because of the prescence of
bureaucratic inertia, combination of functions and absence of com-
prehensive direction. State agencies, oriented towards intra-state prob-
lems, thus do not provide an adequate vehicle for control of interstate
pollution. Indeed, had the state agencies, in many cases, been more
effective in curbing pollution emitters within their respective juris-
dictions, would not the need to create an interstate body for air pol-
lution control be diminished or obviated?
Despite an ostensible lack of power, the commissions created by ad-
visory compacts are often delegated a broader scope of function and
can exert more influence than operating compact agencies when the
compact parties are receptive to the commission's suggestions. 4 This
can be meaningful when, as is the case with the Interstate Sanitation
Commission, the agency can institute an abatement suit when its less
coercive recommendations are ignored.35
Despite recognition of compacts as a viable alternative to direct fed-
eral intervention for solution of interstate environmental pollution con-
trol problems, inherent difficulties in their use exist. It has been ob-
served that ".. . the Compact clause requires something like geological
time to achieve the results that are desirable." 36 The average time to
complete a water resources control compact has been fixed at eight
years, 37 while approximately five years elapse in the typical case from the
signing or initial state ratification to the date of congressional consent.38
Contributing to this glacial slowness is the nature of the formulation
and enactment process. 39 Frequently state parochialism and interstate
antagonisms impede willing co-operation to anticipate problems. Inter-
state authority has most often been "... ground reluctantly out of the
34. LEACH & SUGG 19.
85. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 32:19-4 (1963); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1299-c (McKinney Supp.
1967).
36. H. LASKI, TIE AmERICAN DEMOCRACY 156 (1948).
37. Grad, supra note 28, at 827 (citing MARTIN, BIRKHEAD, ]BURKHEAD & MUNGER, RIVER
BASIN ADMINISTRATION AND THE DELAwARE 131-32 (1960)).
38. F. ZIMMERMANN & M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS 54(1961).
89. A technical distinction exists between the terms "enactment" and "execution"
as applied to compacts. The former only requires, like an ordinary bill, that the appropri-
ate legislature approve it. Execution adds to the enactment procedure a requirement
that the Governor or other official agent, as a separate and subsequent action, formally
execute the compact. Id. at 12-13.
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necessities of the case.. ." as a last resort measure.40 The elapsed time for
securing agreement among states apparently varies in direct proportion
to the controversality of the subject matter and its political-economic
ramifications. 41 Many state constitutions, drafted without considera-
tion of their effect on interstate co-operation, contain sections which,
arguably, obstruct compacts.42 Once the compact is finally in force the
compact agency probably will encounter difficulty in relating and co-
ordinating with governmental structure in the party states.43
Enactment of the compact by the affected states does not bring it to
bear on the designated problem, in most cases. The obstacle of Con-
gressional consent must first be overcome. The consent requirement
was designed to bring within congressional overview "... the forma-
tion of any combination tending to the increase of political power in
the states, which may encroach upon or interfere with the just su-
premacy of the United States. ' 4 4 The Council of State Governments
argued that most interstate agreements, because they do not alter the
"political balance," need not be submitted for consent.4 Indeed, the
"political balance" test may be an anachronism when applied to com-
pacts created for regulation and administration, as contrasted with
those for boundary disputes .4  Apparently, the justification for the
congressional consent requirement today is the avoidance of conflict
with federal law or interests, especially where pre-emption might be
involved.47 However, with respect to compacts for air pollution con-
trol, the Air Quality Act and Clean Air Act compel submission for ap-
40. Leach, Interstate Authorities in the United States, 26 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 666,
668 (1961).
41. ZIMMFIRMANN & WENDELL, supra note 38, at 54.
42. Tobin, supra note 11, at 77, Contra, e.g., ALAS. CONsT. art. XII, § 2; HAWAII CONSr.
art. XIV, 1 5; Mo. CONsT. art. VI, § 16 (specifically sanctioning interstate co-operation).
43. Leach, supra note 40, at 672.
44. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 510 (1893). Other language in the opinion
raises the question of the applicability of the compact clause in terms of its traditional
intent to a pollution control agreement:
If the bordering line of two states should cross some malarious and disease-producing
district, there could be no possible reason, on any conceivable public grounds, to
obtain the consent of Congress for the bordering states to unite in draining the
district and thus removing the cause of disease.
Id., at 518.
45. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, SurGEsTED STATE LEGSsLATION: PROGRAM FOR 1957,
94-95 (1956).
46. See ZINIMERMANN 9 WENDELL, supra note 23, at 35.
47. ZIMMERMANN & WENDELL, supra note 38, at 23.
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proval.48 To expedite this process, Congress could pass legislation
giving advance consent to compactual solutions of certain issues. The
House of Representatives made such an attempt during the delibera-
tions on the Air Quality Act of 1967. But the requirement of congres-
sional ratification was reinserted in conference with the Senate. 49 Once
the compact is ratified, amendments that may be urgently needed to
make it continuously and prospectively viable must again face the
congressional gauntlet. Congress may, by its consent power, impose
restrictions on the proposed agency, and thus limit realization of ini-
tial objectives.50
After a compact has been enacted and ratified, the legal impediments
confronting its functioning appear to be the least obstructive phase
of the compactual process. The most commonly used challenge to
interstate agencies has been that the state's police power cannot be
delegated to such a body. Courts have consistently rejected this argu-
ment,51 holding that merely a conventional and permissible grant of
legislative power is involved. 52 Less frequently used but available
objections, according to one authority, include:
(1) appropriations for the agency did not have a public purpose;
(2) the compact was a special law granting corporate powers; (3)
future legislatures were bound by the compact; (4) officials were
serving in violation of provisions against dual office holding; (5)
officials were serving in violation of election provisions; (6) ex-
penditures of tax money to out-of-state agencies amounted to
loaning credit; and (7) the interstate agency was not a constitu-
tionally authorized political unit.53
But the Supreme Court has historically upheld compacts against these
and similar challenges.5 4 Indeed, in New York v. New Jersey,55 the
Court suggested a compactual approach to an environmental pollution
problem:
the grave problem of sewage disposal presented by the large
and growing populations living on the shores of New York Bay
is one more likely to be wisely solved by co-operative study and
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1857a(c) (Supp. III, 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).
49. 1 CLrEAN AiR NEWS 10 (Nov. 21, 1967).
50. Tobin, supra note 11, at 89. Tobin refers to the detrimental effect of Congressional
restriction on the Missouri-Illinois compact creating the Bi-State Development Agency.
51. Id. at 80 & n.71.
52. E.g., West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 30-31 (1950).
53. Tobin, supra note 11, at 80 & n.71.
54. See notes 58-68 infra and accompanying text.
55. 256 US. 296 (1921).
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by conference and mutual concession on the part of representa-
tives of the states so vitally interested in it than by proceedings in
any court. .... 6
The basis for enforcement of compacts presumably can be derived
from the Contract Clause.57 In an early case, Green v. Biddle,55 the en-
forcement basis was obtained by terming a compact a contract, thus
invoking the Contract Clause.59 In Virginia v. West Virginia the Su-
preme Court asserted that it would enforce a compact against a balk-
ing participant, if necessary, but neglected to delineate how this would
be accomplished. 0 Related to the principle that a compact is an en-
forceable obligation between jurisdictions are instances in which state
statutes were held invalid when in conflict with a compact.61
The Supreme Court's decision in West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v.
Sirnst; has strengthened the compact device and expanded its poten-
tialities. The case developed when West Virginia's auditor refused to
pay appropriated funds to the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation
Commission, a compact agency5 3 The West Virginia Supreme Court
held the statute approving the compact invalid, on the grounds that
(I) the compact unconstitutionally delegated power to an agency out-
side the state; (2) the enactment statute violated the state constitution's
debt limitation provision, by seeking to require subsequent legislatures
to appropriate funds to the Commission.0 4 The United States Supreme
Court upheld the validity of the statute, terming it a ... conventional
grant of legislative power." 65 The Court added:
We find nothing ... to indicate that West Virginia may not solve
a problem such as control of river pollution by compact and by
56. Id. at 313.
57. U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 10.
58. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 92-3 (1823).
59. U.S. CONS?. art. I, § 10.
60. 246 U.S. 565, 591 (1918).
61. E.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823); President, Managers & Co. v.
Trenton City Bridge Co., 13 NJ. Eq. 46 (1860); State v. Faudre, 54 W. Va. 122, 46 S.E.
269 (1903).
62. 341 U.S. 22 (1950).
63. Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact. Compact for purpose of water
pollution abatement in Ohio River drainage basin. Participants: Illinois, Indiana,
Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, West Virginia. For text of compact
see e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, §§ 816.1-.7 (1967).
64. State ex reL Dyer v. Sims, 134 W. Va. 278, 294-98, 58 S.E2d 766, 776-8 (1950).
65. West Virginia ex reL. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 31 (1950).
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the delegation, if such it be, necessary to effectuate such solution
by compact.66
By eliminating uncertainty as to the ability of states to delegate
power and appropriate funds to interstate bodies, Sims provides a
springboard for the creation of the type of agency needed to combat
difficult interjurisdictional problems, such as air pollution. On the
strength of Sims, compact scholars have predicted that the Supreme
Court will sustain compacts and their agencies as valid entities created
by the collective legislative power of the states involved.0 7 The Court
has apparently created a presumption in favor of compacts, and alleged
state constitutional curtailment will be sustained only when an ob-
vious conflict, based on specific prohibition, is discerned.08
III. INTERSTATE AGREEMENTS
Recognition of the need to contrpl interstate air pollution will cer-
tainly be expressed legislatively in 1968 and thereafter. Many state air
pollution control statutes, in states not already participating in an air
pollution control compact, specifically enumerate as one of the duties
or powers of the control authority, consultation and co-operation with
other states, interstate agencies and the federal government. 9 A minor-
ity of these statutes include designation of the control authority as the
body responsible for negotiation of interstate agreements, indicating
a tacit approval of that control technique. 70 Currently, in addition to
states eligible for membership in extant compacts, interest in parti-
66. Id.
67. LEACH & SUGG 13-14.
68. Zimmermann and Wendell, The Interstate Compact and Dyer v. Sims, 51 COLUmn.
L. REV. 931, 949 (1951).
69. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-1935(b) (Supp. 1967); DEfL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6001(c)(5),
6203(a)(2) (Supp. 1966); GA. CODE ANN. § 88-904(c) (Supp. 1967); IowA CODE ANN. § 136BA
(14) (Supp. 1968); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 224.430(8), 224.440(1) (Supp. 1966); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 40:2204(B) (4) (1965); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 366 (Supp. 1967); MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 14.58(5)(n) (Supp. 1968); MIss. CODE ANN. § 7106-116(c) (Supp. 1966); MONT. REv.
CODEs ANN. § 69-3909(14) (Supp. 1967); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125:81(V) (Supp. 1967);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-14-5 B.(4) (Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63 § 2002(C)(b) (Supp.
1967); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-25-5(c) (Supp. 1966); S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-123.1(B)(4) (Supp.
1967); TE X. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-4 § 4(B)(4) (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-8(2)
(Supp. 1967); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 70.94.-[31](4) (Supp. 1967); WIs. STAT. ANN
§ 144.31(l)(e) (Supp. 1968). A suggestion for the inclusion of such provisions can be
found in Tetzlaff, Rogers & Edelman, Guiding Principles for State Air Pollution Legisla-
tion, 51 Ams. J. PuB. HEA.H 182, 188 (1961).
70. IowA CODE ANN. § 136B.4(13) (Supp. 1968); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.58(5) (n) (Supp.
1968); ORE. REv. STAT. § 449.780(4) (1965); S.C. CODE ANN. § 70-123.1(B)(5) (Supp. 1967); TEX.
REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4477-4 § 4(B)(5) (1966); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-24-8(11) (Supp. 1967).
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cipation in regional air pollution control has been evidenced in New
England and in the Ohio River Valley. In December, 1967, the Mas-
sachussetts legislature considered a bill to permit the governor to enter
into a Northeastern regional compact3 1 Rhode Island petitioned the
New England Governors' Conference to form a compact.7 2 Kentucky
recently enacted legislation permitting entry into air pollution control
compacts with neighboring states. 73
The federal government has, by means of legislation and adminis-
tration, encouraged the formation of air pollution control compacts.
Senator Edmund Muskie, the sponsor of the Air Quality Act of 1967, 74
stated, with reference to the act:
The Federal role is expanded both as a supporter of state pro-
grams, and, in the event states fail to act, as an active participant
in the development and implementation of air quality standards.75
To encourage the states to establish control programs, the act pro-
vides generous federal financing, for two years, for interstate plan-
ning bodies established to develop air quality standards in interstate
regions." The Air Quality Act of 1967 and the Clean Air Act of 1963
provide for three-fourths federal financing for interstate authorities.77
They also declared that prevention of air pollution was a state and local
responsibility and ". . . interstate action to abate air pollution shall be
encouraged and shall not be displaced by Federal enforcement action
except as otherwise provided . . ."78 At present, sixteen states have em-
ployed one form or another of interstate agreement to achieve air pol-
lution controlY. The vehicles for co-operation have been administrative
agreements 0 and two types of compact. In one form of compact, air
pollution control has been designated a concern subsidiary, for exam-
ple, to a boundary problem8 l or mining regulation.8 2 The other form
Cf. Miss. CODE ANN. § 7106-116(c) (Supp. 1966). The Kentucky Attorney General is of the
opinion that Ky. REv. STAkT. ANN. §§ 224.430(8), 224.430(1) (Supp. 1966) empowers the
state's air pollution control commission to enter into discussions with other states on
possible compacts. 67 Op. A-r'Y GEN. 187 (Apr. 19, 1967).
71. H. 3412, Mass. (1967).
72. S. 313, R.I. (1967).
73. Ky. LAws, H. 315 (1968).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. III. 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).
75. 113 CONG. REc. S16,393 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 1967).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. III, 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c(a) (Supp. III, 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d(b) (Supp. III, 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).
79. See notes 88-159 infra and accompanying text.
80. See notes 88-92 infra and accompanying text.
81. See notes 98 & 99 infra and accompanying text.
82. See notes 100-102 infra and accompanying text.
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of compact, 83 specifically conceived in response to an extrajurisdictional
source of air pollution, provides the potentially most effective tech-
nique, at the state level, of regulation and abatement.
Administratively, impetus has been given to compact formation by
conferences, focusing on interstate pollution problems, convened by the
Public Health Service. Following the Kansas City abatement confer-
ence, the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare called for the
creation of an interstate control agency. Institution of abatement suits
by the U. S. Attorney General was threatened, if such action was not
taken in six months."" A Missouri-Kansas compact proposal resulted a
few months later.85 The state participants at the New Jersey-New
York abatement conference favored an aggrandizement of the Inter-
state Sanitation Commission to deal with standard promulgation and
enforcement. Federal officials sought an entirely new super-agency.80
The creation of the Mid-Atlantic States Air Pollution Control Com-
pact8 7 comformed to the federal view and absorbed the air pollution
activities formerly directed by the Interstate Sanitation Commission.
A. Administrative Agreements
Interstate co-operation for air pollution control first manifested it-
self in the administrative agreement or informal co-operation form.
Utilization of this form has most frequently occurred in the lower
Delaware River basin area. As early as 1956, following a cataloging of
emissions that affected Philadelphia by that city's Air Pollution Control
Board, a more extensive survey was planned by officials of New Jer-
sey and Pennsylvania."" A 1959 report, sponsored by Penjerdel (a non-
profit, private organization funded by the Ford Foundation) urged
that abatement programs be worked out between the survey authority
and the government having jurisdictions of the extent and nature of
air pollution in the lower Delaware River basin. 0 Finally, in 1966,
Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Philadelphia approved a
co-operative, administrative agreement to facilitate data exchange and
develop air pollution control programs on a regional level.0
83. See notes 103-159 infra and accompanying text.
84. 1 CLEAN Am NEWs 3 (Apr. 25, 1967).
85. See notes 128-146 infra and accompanying text.
86. 5 AIR/WATER POLLUTION REP. 27 (1967).
87. See notes 147-159 infra and accompanying text.
88. Purdon, Interjurisdictional Problems in Air Pollution Control, 77 Pun. HrALTh RE.
681, 685 (1962).
89. 12 JAPCA 331 (1962).
90. 9 Mamo. AREA DIG. 7 (No. 4 1966). In addition, a bill (H.R. 7) was before the 1967
Pennsylvania legislature that would direct the state air pollution commission to contact
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Co-operation has been sporadic in other parts of the country. Prior
to the federally compelled co-operation that culminated in compact
proposals, only three other instances are reported. One such survey
led to the expansion of the powers of the Interstate Sanitation Com-
pact to deal with air pollution.91 In the Chicago area, Illinois and
Indiana undertook a joint study that concluded that greater co-ordina-
tion was necessary. In the Ohio-West Virginia area, the Ohio Valley
Air Pollution Control Council encouraged the area's governmental
units to establish effective pollution controls.92
B. Compacts Providing for Air Pollution Control as a Secondary
Objective
Three compacts that deal with air pollution abatement in addition
to other objectives currently are in force. Of these, only the Interstate
Sanitation Commission Compact93 attempts to deal with air pollution
control in more than a superficial manner. Originally created to com-
bat water pollution, the compact was amended in 1961 to bring inter-
state air pollution within the purview of the Commission's authority.94
As currently enumerated, the powers of the Commission are largely
limited to those of a survey and recommendatory nature. Lacking speci-
fically granted enforcement powers, it is ".... to refer complaints to an
appropriate enforcement agency. . . ."95 However, it is conceivable that
use may be made of the enforcement power granted elsewhere in the
compact. 6 When the Mid-Atlantic States Air Pollution Control Com-
pact obtains congressional approval, it will take over the ISC's air pol-
lution control facilities and responsibilities. 7
The Minnesota-Wisconsin Boundary Compact, focusing primarily
on resource development, suggests that a responsibility of the boundary
commission shall be to devise "... measures for controlling air and
its counterpart in New Jersey and establish control measures for pollution caused by
auto exhaust hrom New Jersey vehicles in Philadelphia.
91. See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
92. Hatchard, Administration of State Air Pollution Control Programs, A Survey, 12
JAPCA 282, 284 (1962).
93, CO'NN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 25-55 to 25-66 (1958); N.J. REv. STAT. § 32:18-1 to 32:19A-9
(1963); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1299 to 1299-1 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
94. N.J. REv. STAT. § 32:19A-1 to 9 (1963); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1299-1 (McKinney
Supp. 1967). Connecticut does not participate in the air pollution control activities sanc-
tioned by the compact. A bill (S. 1843) was introduced in the 1967 Connecticut legislature
to permit that state's full participation in the air pollution control program.
95. N.J. REv. STAT. § 32:19A-l(e) (1963); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 1299-1(e) (McKinney
Supp. 1967).
96. See, e.g., N.J. REv. STAT. § 32:19-4 (1963).
97. Eg., N.J. Rrv. STAT. § 32:29-38 (Supp. 1967).
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water pollution ... ."98 However, its authority is wholly advisory;
the compact commission could only implore the appropriate gov-
ernmental units to eliminate an interstate pollution source. 99 North
Carolina in 1967 enacted an Interstate Mining Compact. 00 Among the
mining problems treated is ". . . the reduction or elimination or coun-
teracting of pollution or deterioration of land, water and air attribut-
able to mining."''1 The compact authority lacks enforcement power
and will function largely in a recommendatory manner.102
C. Interstate Compacts
At present there are four compacts created exclusively for the con-
trol of interstate air pollution. They are the Illinois-Indiana Air Pol-
lution Control Compact,103 the Interstate Compact on Air Pollution
(Ohio-West Virginia), 0 4 the Kansas-Missouri Air Quality Com-
pact, 05 and the Mid-Atlantic States Air Pollution Control Compact.100
None is in effect. Either Congress has failed to provide the necessary
consent legislation'0 7 or a necessary party state has not enacted the
compact. 08
1. Illinois-Indiana Air Pollution Control Compact
This compact has been in existence since 1965 but, as noted pre-
viously, has yet to function because of Congress' failure to grant ap-
98. The compact is set out in MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 4.144(l)-(8) (Supp. 1966); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 1.31-.34 (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 14.752 (Supp. 1967). The quoted material is at
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1.31(1) (1965); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 14.752 (Supp. 1967).
99. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1.31(1) (1965); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 14.752 (Supp. 1967).
100. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74-37 (Supp. 1967). No other states have yet become signatories
to the compact.
101. Id. Art. I(b)(2).
102. Id. Art. IV(3).
103. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1111, § 240.31 (Smith-Hurd 1966); IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4621
(Supp. 1968).
104. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3723.01-.03 (Page Supp. 1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29-IG-1
to 29-IG-5 (Supp. 1968).
105. Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 203.600-.620 (Supp. 1967); S. 430, KAN. (1967).
106. N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 32:29-1 to 32:29-39 (Supp. 1967); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 1299-m
(McKinney Supp. 1967); S. 1957, CONN. (June 21, 1967).
107. In the second session of the 89th Congress, H.R. 9582 and S. 3210 were introduced
to secure approval of the Illinois-Indiana Compact. Both were referred to their houses'
judiciary committees where they died. The same fate befell H.R. 1150 and S. 470 in the
first session of the 90th Congress. H.R.J. Res. 645 sought to obtain federal consent to the
Mid-Atlantic States Compact but died in the judiciary committee. H.R. 13034 and S. 2350
sought consent to the Ohio-West Virginia Compact and also died in committee.
108. Kansas-Missouri Compact. A bill to enact the compact "died" in the 1968 Kansas
legislature. Letter from Kansas Legislative Council to Peter Ruger, Sept. 27, 1968.
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proval. It is doubtful that this compact will ever be approved by Con-
gress, unless drastic revision is undertaken to rectify its glaring defi-
ciencies.It'  While the drafters of this document merit some credit for
a "first," this compact should not be regarded as a prototype.
The compact's initial weakness is its statement of "findings and
purpose." Statements that indicate a direct causal relationship must
be shown between pollution emanating from one party state and re-
sulting injuries in another will create potential enforcement difficul-
ties." ,' If the language of the compact were strictly interpreted, effective
pollution control would be inhibited (or even impossible) because of
the inability of tracing and identifying pollutants and their effect in a
metropolitan area. Perhaps a better solution would be to recognize
that interstate pollution does exist and that the enforcement agency
can deal with sources of pollution that could reasonably be expected
to have a detrimental effect on the air quality of the inter-jurisdictional
area.
The compact creates a commission composed of seven persons from
each party state."' No federal representation is provided. 112 No action
will be undertaken by the commission unless a majority of each state's
commissioners are present and approve.113 Such a requirement, while
desirable to maintain comity when only two states are signatories to
a compact, could retard effective action if a party state was lax in its
enforcement attitude. The commission and its employees are not sub-
ject to the states' civil service systems.1 4 This could diminish its effec-
tiveness as its employees would be subject to "political" pressures and
thus arguably less inclined to engage in the aggressive and decisive
control activity required for abatement.
The heart of the compact is Article IV-Functions. This section
initially outlines a survey and recommendatory function for the com-
mission. The commission "may make studies of interstate air pollution
problems" and, when interstate pollution is found, "shall make a report
recommending measures for prevention, abatement or control." 11 The
109. See notes 163-165 infra and accompanying text.
110. "The guiding principle of this compact shall be that air pollution originating
within a party state shall not injuriously affect humans, plants, animal life or property in
the other party state." IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4621 Art. I(c) (Supp. 1968).
111. Id. Art. III(b).
112. Id.
113. Id. (c).
114. Id. (f).
115. Id. Art. IV(a).
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power to set standards is given the commission but such standards must
be "consistent" with (no higher than) those promulgated by the party
states. 116 This could be interpreted to mean that the standards of the
state with the most permissive pollution control legislation could
govern in the interstate region, thus decreasing the ability of the other
party state to control interstate polluters within its own borders.
The compact commission's enforcement authority is especially ill-
designed to effectively combat air pollution. If the commission's abate-
ment suggestions are not complied with and the pollution problem
persists, the commission can take action in its own stead.1 7 But, before
court action against an offender can be initiated, a number of steps in-
tervene. At least six months must elapse after the control recommen-
dation before the commission can even convene a hearing to determine
whether to issue an abatement order to a polluter. If a determination
were made of the existence of interstate air pollution and its sources,
orders would then be issued upon the responsible parties to take the
requisite corrective measures. These orders can be enforced by any
court of competent jurisdiction, if the commission chooses to seek en-
forcement." 8
The procedural limitations on the commission's enforcement power
clearly reduce its potential impact on what is an immediately critical
problem-the control of interstate pollutants. A quick response to a
serious pollution problem is impossible. Even after it has completed
its study of pollution and recommended abatement steps, six months
must elapse before the commission can convene the hearing that ulti-
mately may produce an abatement order. 19 At best, this process would
take one year. Another possible weakness in the Illinois-Indiana agree-
ment is the high degree of discretion vested in the commission with
regard to enforcement decisions. A clearer definition of the commis-
sion's authority making their duty more ministerial when the source-
effect pollution finding was made would be more desirable.
In addition, the compact does not create an extensive staff even
for its survey functions and apparently will utilize existant state and
municipal agencies to perform its control objectives. The niggardly
appropriation-a total of $15,000-would further curtail an ambitious
program. 120
116. Id. Art. IV(d).
117. Id.
118. Id. (e).
119. Id. (d).
120. IND. ANN. STAT. § 35-4624 (Supp. 1968); ILL. LAWS 1965, 1045 (June 22, 1965).
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2. Interstate Compact on Air Pollution
The Ohio-West Virginia Compact' 2' is merely a copy of the Illinois-
Indiana Compact. However, one change is that a tie vote of the com-
missioners permits the deciding vote to be cast by the vote of a re-
presentative selected by the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health,
Education and Welfare. 2 2 The compact commission functions in the
same manner as in the Illinois-Indiana Compact, acting in a recom-
mendatory role. More specific procedures are detailed for allowing a
putative polluter to render objections to a commission report.123 The
standard establishment sentence is substantially identical to that of its
precursor. 12 4 A "reasonable" time requirement for implementation of
commission recommendations is substituted for the six months mini-
mum of the Illinois-Indiana Compact. 25 The remainder of the en-
forcement procedures are substantially the same as those enacted in
the earlier compact. 26 This flaccid document, while arguably better
than no attempt at control, hardly provides a basis for an effective as-
sault on the environmental deficiencies of that region. 27
3. Kansas-Missouri Air Quality Compact
The January 1967 Kansas City Interstate Air Pollution Conference,
convened by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare under
the mandate of the Clean Air Act, 28 recommended that Missouri and
Kansas create an interstate control agency and grant it the following:
(1) Authority to establish uniform ambient air quality standards
for at least an affected six county area;
(2) Adequate rule making and enforcement authority to abate,
control and prevent air pollution;
(3) Authority to establish a regional enforcement agency, with ap-
propriate representation of local governments, supported by local
financial resources;
(4) Assurance of adequate budgetary support by states;
121. OHio Rrv. CODE ANN. §§ 3723.01-.03 (Page 1967); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 29-IG-1 to
-5 (Supp. 1968).
122. E.g., W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29-IG-2 (art. III) (Supp. 1968).
123. Id. art. IV.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126, Id.
127. For an extended discussion of specific weaknesses, see notes 109-120 supra and accom-
pan)ing text.
128. 42 U.S.C. J 1857d (1965).
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(5) Federal representation on the interstate agency with the same
vote as any state.129
The resulting Kansas-Missouri Air Quality Compact substantially em-
braced these suggestions. Enacted by Missouri in 1967, the compact
has yet to be approved by Kansas. 30
The Kansas-Missouri Compact is a considerably more comprehensive
and complete document than the Illinois-Indiana and Ohio-West
Virginia agreements. Major provisions include a more complete defi-
nitions section,' 31 a more precise enunciation of purpose, 13 2 a vote for
the federal government representative if the state representatives are
deadlocked, 33 a comprehensive enumeration of general powers,1 3 4 a
specific penalty provision,135 adequate funding, 36 and, most important,
extensive standard setting and enforcement powers. 37 The compact
commission is given power to collect data on the nature of pollution
in the area, and, after hearing, ". . . establish ambient air quality stan-
dards for the entire area subject to the commission's jurisdiction or
for any part thereof."'3 8 These standards, significantly, become the
minimum norm for the area. State and local legislation must meet (or
exceed) the commission's standards. 13 9
The compact's enforcement mechanism deals more effectively with
polluters. When the executive director of the commission believes that
a violation has occurred, he serves notice upon the alleged violator and
upon the appropriate state control agency. If a hearing is requested, the
commission grants it.14° Upon finalization of the abatement order, fail-
ure to comply permits the commission to seek judicial enforcement in
a United States district court.' 4' The court shall assess a penalty of up
to $1000 for violation of the compact's provisions or any of the com-
129. 5 AIR/WATER POLLUTION REP. 35 (1967).
130. Mo REv. STAT. §§ 203.600-.620 (Supp. 1967); Kansas S.B. 430 (1967). Kansas failed
again to enact the compact during its 1968 legislative session. See note 108 supra.
131. E.g., Mo. Rav. STAT. § 203.600(2.1)-(2.5) (Supp. 1967).
132. Id. 3.1.
133. Id. 4.3.
134. Id. 5.1.
135. Id. 9.1.
136. Mo. S. B. 408 (1967). An annual appropriation of $40,000 from each state for the
commission would be provided when all signatory parties approve the compact.
137. E.g., Mo. REv. STAT. § 203.600 (art. V & X) (Supp. 1967).
138. Id. 5.1(1).
139. Id. 10.1.
140. Id. 5.6.
141. Id. 6.6.
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mission's regulations or orders. 142 In addition, each day of a continuing
offense shall constitute a separate offense. 143 The inclusion of an emer-
gency clause is another significant innovation. It permits the commis-
sion to order immediate reduction or cessation of emission of air con-
taminants when ". . . such condition creates an emergency requiring
immediate action to protect human health or safety. . ...- 14
The Kansas-Missouri Compact represents a considerable advance, in
terms of potential effectiveness, from the previously discussed com-
pacts. Ironically many of its provisions bear resemblance to those of
the Model Air Pollution Compact,145 designed for the St. Louis metro-
politan area, that the Missouri legislature failed to enact in 1967.146
4. Mid-Atlantic States Air Pollution Control Compact
Patterned after the Delaware River Basin Compact,147 the Mid-At-
lantic States Air Pollution Control Compact, with Connecticut,14
New Jersey 49 and New York' 50 as initial signatories, is designed to
implement a regional "airshed" approach to air pollution problems.
Delaware and Pennsylvania are also invited to participate. The regional
effectiveness of the compact has been endangered by Pennsylvania's
reluctance to join. Governor Raymond Shafer expressed concern that
the broad, state-wide scope and standards of the Mid-Atlantic States
142. ld. 9.1.
143. Id.
144. Id. 5.8(a).
145. For a detailed analysis of the Model Act, see Note, A Model Interstate Compact
for the Control of Air Pollution, 4 HARV. J. LrGis. 369 (1967). In fact, the Model Act,
adopted by the East-West Gateway Co-ordinating Council, was never presented to the
Missouri legislature. The Missouri-Illinois Compact proposals before the Missouri legisla-
ture (S. 351. S. 370, H. 874), resembled more closely the Illinois-Indiana compact than the
Model or Kansas-Missouri compacts.
146. The compact was stricken from the Missouri Senate calendar by Sen. Richard Web-
ster (from rural Carthage, Missouri). Apparently his reason for this action was hostility
toward Lewis Green, chairman of the Missouri Air Conservation Commission, whom he
denounced when removing the compact from legislative consideration. St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, May 31, 1967, at IA, col. 1. Prior to this, Missouri officials had expressed disap-
pointment at the Illinois' officials unwillingness to agree to stringent control standards.
5 AIR/WVATER POLLUTION REP. 211 (1967). A measure (H. 644) that would have authorized
local governments in Missouri to enter into and perform contracts and agreements for air
pollution control with governments in adjoining states also failed to win approval.
147. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
148. CONN. S. 1957 (1967).
149. N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 32:29-1 to 32:29-39 (Supp. 1967).
150. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1299-m (McKinney Supp. 1967).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1968/iss2/5
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Compact would preclude Pennsylvania from participating in a com-
pact to control air pollution with the Ohio Valley basin states.' 5'
Basically, the compact empowers its commission to:
(1) Carry out research on air pollution and abatement techniques;
(2) Establish regional air quality standards (formulate an air pol-
lution code);
(3) Investigate sources and causes of air pollution, identify pol-
luters and seek court action to penalize violators;
(4) Declare regional air pollution alerts and emergencies. 52
The compact does not pre-empt existing state and local control legis-
lation consistent with that promulgated pursuant to the commission's
authority. The commission's standards serve as the norm. Thus more
restrictive state and local standards are permitted.', 3
The structure and procedures established by the compact can facili-
tate effective control. The commission consists of one member from
each participating state and the federal government. A majority vote
of the membership is necessary for action.' 4 The compact's enforce-
ment procedures appear to be the least cumbersome of any of the
compacts. The commission itself may, after a hearing, proceed directly
against any violator of its abatement regulations.'r5 The commission
may bring an enforcement action in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion.:56 However, before it may exercise its emergency abatement pow-
ers, authorization must be obtained from the signatory state from
which the emissions emanate. 57 Its penalty provision is also weaker
than that in the Kansas-Missouri Compact in that the monetary pen-
alties apply only when no local penal sanctions exist. 58 Adequate fi-
nancing is accomplished. 59 In summary, this compact provides the
machinery for effective interstate action. Full achievement of the orig-
inal objectives of the compact, however, is contingent upon the parti-
cipation of Delaware and Pennsylvania.
D. Federal Response to the' Air Pollution Compacts
Expression of the federal attitude toward the existing compacts has
yet been incomplete, especially in light of lack of congressional sanc-
151. 1 CLEAN ArR NEws 4, 5 (Oct. 24, 1967).
152. E.g., NJ. REV. STAT. §§ 32:29-14 to 21 (Supp. 1967).
153. Id. § 32:29-13.
154. Id. § 32:29-10.
155. Id. § 32:29-18.
156. Id.
157. Id. § 32:29-17.
158. Id. § 32:29-20.
159. E.g., N.J. LAws ch. 107, § 7.5 (1967). $50,000 annually appropriated by N.J.
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tion, rejection, or modification of the extant agreements. However,
in the recent Senate hearings on the compacts, representatives of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare outlined the contents
needed for a compact to comply with the Air Quality Act of 1967 and
be an effective vehicle for the control of air pollution. In addition,
they disparaged the existing compacts.
HEW proposed the following compact criteria:' 60
(1) Only the states in a designated air quality region should partic-
ipate in the compact.' 61 A compact should provide for participa-
tion by all states encompassed by a given air quality region.
(2) Federal representation, but not voting, on compact commis-
sions.1 2
(3) Each participating state should have one vote on the compact
commission.
(4) The compact commissions should have broad air monitoring,
standard setting and enforcement powers.
(5) Air pollution should be defined by the compact instrument to
permit preventative activities by the compact commission.
(6) The state's meeting of obligations imposed by the federal air
pollution legislation should be enhanced by the compact.
HEW found defects in all the compacts under consideration. The
least acceptable compacts were the similar Illinois-Indiana and Ohio-
West Virginia documents. The basic defect in both is inadequate
standard-setting and enforcement procedures. Preventative action is
limited, partly due to an allegedly inadequate definition of air pollu-
tion and a difficult proof situation that requires that a finding be
made that the pollution has caused actual injury.' 63 Neither com-
pact authorizes direct enforcement action by the commission. HEW
criticized the apparent intent of the compact drafters to provide for
action only when a signatory state's control activities are so lax as to
create a pollution problem in an adjoining state.' 64 Absence of federal
representation on the Illinois-Indiana Compact, and voting member-
ship on the Ohio-'West Virginia body were also criticized. 6 5
160. Hearings on Air Pollution Compacts before the Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollu-
tion of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 464 (1968) (hereinafter
cited as Hearings on Compacts).
161. Designation of air quality regions will soon be made by HEW, pursuant to the Air
Quality Act 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-2(a) (Supp. III, 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).
162. HEW fears that a federal vote would perhaps limit the subsequent review of the
compact agency's action by the Secretary of HEW. Hearings on Compacts 464.
163. Hearings on Compacts 466. Contra, id. at 518.
164. Id. 466.
165. Id. 465.66.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1968/iss2/5
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
The Mid-Atlantic States Compact was attacked on two grounds:
the grant of voting membership to the federal representative' 0 and,
more significantly, its intent to include states that do not form what is
(or will be) an air quality control region.0 7 That is, none of these states
is affected by a common air pollution problem.
Despite the compact's enactment prior to the Air Quality Act of
1967, the hearings revealed a concern, on the part of HEW and the
members of the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution,
notably Senator Edmund Muskie, that the compacts be compatible
with the Air Quality Act or at least not minimize its effectiveness.'
The hearings indicate that rather than approve these compacts as initial
devices for attacking interstate air pollution, the federal government
may, by further inaction, leave the status of these compacts in doubt,
hoping to provoke revisions by the states. Or Congress may choose to
alter the compacts or to reject them. These latter alternatives may be
preferable to future compact drafters, but only if Congress enunciates
more clearly the requisites of an acceptable air pollution compact.
CONCLUSION
If the federal policy toward air pollution control is dearly enunci-
ated by the Air Quality Act of 1967,169 it is certain that the interstate
compact will be extensively employed as a technique for the establish-
ment of a control mechanism, unless states choose, by inaction or
design, to have the federal government solely combat pollution along
their borders. To be most viable, compacts must take the form of the
Kansas-Missouri or Mid-Atlantic States agreements. Federal legislation
and Congressional hearings either expressly or impliedly reach this
conclusion.7 0
Essential to any meaningful abatement program are provisions em-
powering the control agency to:
(1) Set minimum standards for the interstate area.
166. Id. 465.
167. Id. 450.
168. Id. 292, 426, 463-66, 471, 477, 478.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. III 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964). However, the
dilatory approach of Congress toward examination preparatory to consent or rejection
may indicate a contrary tendency. See notes 86-48 supra and accompanying text.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (Supp. III 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964); Hearings on
Compacts.
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(2) Proceed rapidly and decisively against violators of its regula-
tions and orders.
(3) Seek imposition of heavy penal sanctions that would deter, on
economic considerations, potential or actual polluters.
(4) Act decisively in emergency situations.
(5) Obtain adequate financing.
Rather than encouraging the proliferation of environmental control
agencies for each substance despoiled, perhaps a more viable long term
approach would be to merge pollution control activities in a single
agency. Today a number of water pollution control districts exist to
which the air pollution control function could be grafted.171
But perhaps rather than expressing concern over the form the
compact is to take, the more appropriate query is whether the com-
pact should be used at all as a device for interstate air pollution control.
Certain hindrances to its potential effectiveness are apparent. One
of these is the time consuming process of obtaining congressional
consent. The historical justification for this, that it is necessary
... to protect the nascent republic from such ententes among
powerful states as would aggrandize their political power at the
expense or the compromise of national sovereignty .... 172
is an anachronism today. Congress can, in advance, grant its consent to
a compact. Indeed, this alternative was considered, but ultimately
rejected, in the final draft of the Air Quality Act of 1967.173
Advance consent legislation would deprive Congress of initial super-
visory authority over the compact,174 but the detriment to federal in-
terests would be minimal, if a federal representative were accorded
equal voting rights, as in the Mid-Atlantic States Compact. 75 Advance
consent would permit immediate implementation of the compact
upon acceptance by the party states, an important consideration.
171. Eg., Columbia Interstate Compact provides for consideration of "common
problems" (pollution) with respect to resource development. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 42-3403
(Supp. 1967). New England Interstate Planning Compact provides for broad resource
planning and management functions. ME. Rv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 301-317 (Supp. 1967).
Of course, greater enforcement and standard setting power would have to be inserted in
these compacts, but their regional focus provides a firm basis for control of environmental
pollution problems.
172. Bode v. Barrett, 412 IIl. 204, 233, 106 N.E.2d 521, 536 (1952).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 1857a(c) (Supp. I1 1968), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1857 (1964).
174. See generally Note, Congressional Supervision of Interstate Compacts, 75 YALE L.J.
1416 (1966).
175. NJ. REv. STAT. § 32:29-10 (Supp. 1967).
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In the last analysis, control and prevention of interstate air pollu-
tion may be best left to the federal government. Historical considera-
tions point to this conclusion. Water pollution control compacts have
been only minimally effective, on the whole.' 7 6 For example, under the
Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Compact, effective in 1948, no
enforcement power was employed until 1956.177 As of 1963, the Ohio
Valley Compact Agency had never taken legal action against an in-
dustry to secure compliance with its water quality standards. 178 Five
actions had been begun against municipalities but these were dropped
when the alleged offender began to construct treatment facilities. 170
Another persuasive argument for federal pre-emption in this area is
the existence of greater financial and technical resources. State govern-
ments have traditionally been more susceptible to pressure from
economically powerful interests opposed to extensive emission controls.
When a problem as immediate and as serious as interstate air pollution
exists, as it clearly does today, it hardly is reasonable to deal with it
through fictions euphemistically termed "creative federalism" that
permit continued lax control in this field. If federal action is not to
pre-empt this field, future compacts must.be enacted and implemented
without the delay that prevails today, and these compacts must provide
for regulatory and enforcement techniques far superior to those of
their constituent states.
176. E. MURPHY, WATER Puirry 19 (1961).
177. W. BARTON, INTERSTATE COMPACTS IN THE POLITICAL PROC.S 36, 39 (1965).
178. Id. 39.
179. Id.
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